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Summary
This paper investigates the links
between institutional systems and the
entry mode of Multinational
Corporations (MNCs) in developing
and transition countries (DTCs). An
assessment is made of the reasons for
the continuing use of international joint
ventures (IJVs) in countries that have
undergone reforms intended to lead to
the development of wholly owned
subsidiaries. The paper argues that
formal and informal institutional
constraints in DTCs lead to high
transaction and uncertainty costs for
MNCs, and that the use of IJVs is a
rational response to attempt to lower
these high costs. The paper follows the
literature suggesting that IJVs are
normally a ‘second best’ entry mode
in terms of the potential for foreign
direct investment (FDI) to contribute
to the development of DTCs. The
reform process in Jordan is used to
illustrate how institutional systems,
especially informal institutional
constraints, lead to high transaction
and uncertainty costs. In the case of
Jordan, this occurred despite a series
of four reform packages seeking to
reduce the institutional barriers to
effective business activities. Interviews
of 28 foreign companies provide the
basis for an empirical assessment of
the importance of both formal and
informal institutional constraints and
infrastructure problems. The paper
includes an outline of a future research
agenda that seeks to generalise and
develop the results from Jordan to other
DTCs.
1. Introduction
The bulk of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into
developing and transition countries (DTCs) has been
by International Joint Ventures (IVJs) (UNCTAD,
1995; World Bank, 1996). The traditional explanation
for the extensive use of IJVs in DTCs is that legal
restrictions, such as prohibitions on full ownership,
uncertainty over property rights and taxation systems,
limit the development of wholly owned subsidiaries.
Many DTCs have reformed their formal institutional
systems to reduce or remove these obstacles to full
ownership, thereby hoping to promote DFI inflows
more helpful to the development process. Formal
institutional constraints include political and legal
procedures, as well as government agencies that
control and regulate economic and social activities.
Reform of formal institutional systems does not,
however, necessarily mean that informal institutional
constraints are altered in such way that the reforms
become effective. Informal institutional constraints
include norms of behaviour and attitudes to the
procedures used in operating formal institutional
systems.
The paper begins with an overview of the orthodox
position, which identifies formal institutional
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constraints and cultural factors as the main obstacles
to FDI inflows. There is a review of the emerging
literature focusing on problems associated with
corruption and regulatory burdens which impede FDI
inflows. This provides the background for an analysis
of institutional constraints as a major inhibitor of FDI
inf lows. The analysis of informal institutional
constraints provides a framework suggesting that
these constraints can lead to high uncertainty and
transaction costs for ‘outsiders’ (foreign investors),
and that this induces the use of IJVs able to provide a
viable, but ‘second best’, alternative to full ownership.
A review of the reforms in Jordan, and of the
continuing problems of attracting DFI there, highlights
the continuance of institutional constraints that lead
to high transaction costs, thereby inhibiting the
development of wholly owned subsidiaries. Interviews
of 28 foreign investors in Jordan provide an empirical
assessment of the importance of informal constraints
as a barrier to the use of alternatives to IJVs. The
paper concludes with an outline of a future research
agenda, which should improve and expand our
understanding of the importance of institutional
factors for the development of the subsidiaries of
MNCs in DTCs.
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2. Limitations to FDI in DTCs
The traditional literature on obstacles to FDI in DTCs
is centred on the role of risk factors, such as poor
infrastructure, arbitrary taxation and regulatory
systems, as well as exchange and capital control
policies that hamper the operations of MNCs.  High
risk in these areas is considered to discourage MNCs
from investing in developing countries (Brewer, 1993;
Kobrin, 1979; Thomas and Worrall, 1994). Cultural
differences also add to the risks of investing in DTCs
(McCarthy, Puffer and Simmonds, 1993;
Schlegelmilch, Diamantopoulos and Petersen, 1991).
The combination of these problems is considered to
result in high costs for ‘outsiders’ (MNCs) entering
such countries, and acts as an incentive to seek the
assistance of ‘insiders’ (local partners) to reduce these
risk factors.
The use of IJVs reduces these risks by linking MNCs
to domestic agents who have experience, knowledge
and contacts which help foreign companies to operate
effectively within the institutional system of the host
country. In DTCs, therefore, the incentive to use IJVs
appears to be mainly due to problems associated with
institutional factors, such as bureaucratic and taxation
rules, which inhibit the development of wholly owned
subsidiaries (Meyer, 1998; Wheeler and Ashoka,
1992). In contrast, the incentive to use joint ventures,
including IJVs, in developed economies is connected
to a variety of strategic reasons, such as achieving
economies of scale, rationalisation of operations,
exchanging or gaining access to new technologies
and resources, and penetrating markets (Harrigan,
1988). Although IJVs offer a means of reducing the
high transaction and uncertainty costs associated with
institutional systems in DTCs, they normally provide
a ‘second best’ solution for capturing the benefits of
FDI. The problem with IJVs is that they are prone to
instability and arguments over the distribution of
profits, and that they have high risks associated with
loss of intellectual property (Buckley and Casson,
1996). These risks make MNCs reluctant to transfer
technologies embodying the best products,
production, and marketing and distribution systems
(Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Smarzynska and Wei,
2001).
The problems posed to DTCs by poor institutional
systems are recognised in the literature (Aswicahyono
and Hill, 1995, Gobermann and Shaprio, 1999).
Indeed, political and economic stability, together with
legally enforceable safeguards for physical assets and
intellectual property, is considered essential to attract
even low levels of FDI (UNCTAD, 1998). This
literature focuses on the need to develop formal
institutional constraints, such as well-defined property
rights and effective government policies and agencies
to control and regulate economic activity. The impact
of informal institutional constraints on FDI inflows is
mainly considered in reference to the differences in
cultural values between home and host countries. The
solution to differences in cultural values is normally
related to the design of management systems that
can effectively operate within the context of the
different cultural values prevailing in various countries
(Hofstede, 1994). The cultural values approach has
been developed by the introduction of the concept of
psychic distance, whereby differences in business
practices, legal systems and language are added to
the cultural dimensions of Hofstede (O’Grady and
Lane, 1996). However, the psychic distance approach
does not fully capture the concept of informal
institutional constraints, because the focus is on formal
institutional factors, such as the characteristics of legal
systems, the nature of the competitive environment
and regulatory frameworks. In the psychic distance
approach, informal institutional constraints are mainly
captured by variables that seek to measure problems
with languages and differences in cultural values.
Moreover, empirical studies based on the concept of
psychic distance tend not to discover any significant
systematic relationships between psychic distance and
organisational performance (Statlinger and
Schlegelmilch, 1998).
Contemporary consideration of the impact of
informal institutional failings on FDI inf lows is
focused on the importance of factors such as
corruption, administrative malfunction, arbitrary
taxation and regulatory frameworks regarded as
inhibiting investment. Commercial organisations have
used these types of institutional factors to develop
competitiveness indices, for example, the Global
Competition Report, the World Economic Forum
Survey and the opacity index of Pricewaterhouse
Coopers. International institutions have also
formulated policies to counter the harmful affects of
these institutional failings (World Bank, 1997a,
OECD, 1999). Furthermore, academics have sought
to develop and test theories on the relationship
between institutional failings (particularly corruption)
and investment (Smarzynska and Wei, 2001; Wei,
2000; Habib and Zurawicki, 2001). Work on the
influence of institutional failings on modes of entry
focuses on the trade-off (when using IJVs) between
the benefits of helping to deal with difficult
institutional systems and the risk of opportunistic
behaviour by local partners leading to expropriation
of assets and low returns to foreign investors (Henisz,
2000).
The preparations for the 1997 World Bank Report,
and the aftermath of this report, led to efforts by the
World Bank to f ind evidence of the impact of
institutional failings by surveying firms in order to assess
the major institutional obstacles to business
operations (Brunetti et al, 1997; Kaufmann et al, 1999;
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Pfeffermann and Kisienko, 1999). This work led to
the establishment of a World Business Environment
Survey (WBES) to assess the impact of institutional
failings on the performance of firms
(www.worldbank.org/wbes.htm). The WBES has
generated a database by integrating surveys of firms
in 90 countries, thus providing a comprehensive
overview of the impact of institutional failings on
business activities.
This work reveals that investments by both MNCs
and domestic investors are adversely influenced by
institutional failings in DTCs. Many of these failings
are linked to formal institutional factors, but informal
institutional failings, such as corruption, crime,
administrative malfunction and the arbitrary
enforcement of taxation and regulatory frameworks,
are increasingly seen as significant obstacles to the
operational effectiveness of MNCs in DTCs. Most of
this work, however, focuses on the importance of
corruption.
Using the literature on institutional failure and new
institutional economics as a guide, the links between
institutional systems and transaction and uncertainty
costs, as well as the implications for entry mode, are
outlined in order to provide a conceptual framework
that highlights the main reasons for the use of IJVs.
This framework forms the basis for an empirical study
of the influence of institutional failings on entry mode.
3. Transaction Costs and Institutional
Frameworks
Transaction cost theory indicates that institutional
frameworks can facilitate low cost exchange by
reducing the transaction and uncertainty costs
associated with exchange (Williamson, 1985;
Williamson, 1998; Matthews, 1986). New institutional
economics argues that the characteristics of
institutional systems are path-determined by history,
and that fundamental change to formal, and especially
informal, constraints can only emerge slowly as
societies adjust to changing circumstances (North,
1983, North, 1990, North, 1994). Another important
aspect of new institutional economics is the
effectiveness of adjusting institutional constraints in
response to economic, political, social and
technological change. This has been termed the
adaptive efficiency of institutional systems (North,
1990). The adaptive efficiency of institutional systems
is an important factor for the level of transaction and
uncertainty costs in conditions of rapid economic,
political, social and technological change  (North,
1999).
At the heart of the analysis of the importance of
institutional frameworks are the types of exchange
that are possible within given institutional frameworks.
Three main types of exchange are considered by
North, (1990):
1. Personalised exchange systems are based on
repeated dealings within culturally homogenous
blocs, for example, extended families or
primitive tribal groups. These systems depend
on high levels of trust or hostage mechanisms
ensuring that implicit contracts are honoured.
They have low transaction and uncertainty costs
if exchange is restricted within a homogenous
bloc. This type of exchange reduces
specialisation because only a small number of
agents (members of the family or tribe) are
included in the exchange system. These systems
normally have poor adaptive efficiency and
often disintegrate when confronted by minor
economic, social or technical changes.
2. Impersonal exchange systems without third
party enforcement are based on groups (tribes,
guilds, networks) that have shared values and
informal enforcement processes which establish
trust or hostage mechanisms to ensure that
implicit contracts are fulfilled. This type of
exchange has low transaction and uncertainty
costs if the informal enforcement procedures
are effective. However, they limit specialisation
and potential trading partners to agents who
are members of the tribe, guild or network.
These systems find it difficult to take advantage
of the benefits of wider trading opportunities
and to reap economies of scale and scope. They
also tend to have poor adaptive efficiency and
often find it difficult to adjust to economic,
political, social and technical change.
3. Impersonal exchange systems with third party
enforcement may make use of trust or hostage
mechanisms based on tribal, guild or network
arrangements, but have formal systems, such
as laws, courts and regulatory agencies, which
act as third party enforcers of explicit and, in
some cases, implicit contracts. Moreover,
informal constraints support the formal
institutional systems and thereby help to enforce
explicit and implicit contracts. Systems of this
type have developed formal and informal
institutional systems that are able to create,
maintain and develop the conditions that
permit impersonal exchange with low
transaction and uncertainty costs. This type of
exchange permits substantial levels of
specialisation and a large pool of potential
traders with whom it is deemed safe to do
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business. Moreover, they have high levels of
adaptive efficiency, allowing quick adjustment
to new conditions arising from economic,
political, social and technical change.
To achieve effective impersonal exchange with third
party enforcement, DTCs need to create and develop
institutional systems with formal and informal
institutional constraints that deliver low transaction
and uncertainty costs. This raises the question as to
why many DTCs appear to be failing to achieve such
an outcome. The answer to this conundrum, according
to new institutional economics, is that the creation of
institutional structures involves large sunk costs arising
from the process of creating and implementing new
institutional frameworks (North, 1990). Therefore,
there are strong vested interests that seek to retain
the status quo by avoiding the costs of substantial
institutional reform. To overcome these vested
interests there must be powerful reasons to change
these frameworks. Furthermore, the feedback on
outcomes from existing institutional structures (to the
various actors involved) is often asymmetrically
distributed, incomplete and slowly disseminated.
Under these circumstances, changes to the formal
and informal constraints on human interaction are
normally very slow. Institutional evolution is, therefore,
largely the result of the realisation by actors that a
new round of institution building is necessary, and
that sunk costs must be incurred in this process.
Incurring such costs is justifiable if the cost of existing
outcomes exceeds the sunk costs necessary to build
new institutions, or to modify existing institutional
frameworks. In most cases, change will be incremental
because the various actors are likely to have different
ideas and information about the size of the sunk costs
and the costs associated with existing outcomes,
thereby making it difficult to agree on significant
changes to institutional structures. These factors
explain why institutional systems that are ineffective
can be constructed and sustained. Societies can,
therefore, inherit stable but ineffective institutional
structures based on a set of beliefs, resources and power
bases determined by history (Akerlof, 1976; Argyres
and Liebeskind, 1999). Under these circumstances, it
is unlikely that actors will make dramatic changes from
the path they have been following (Zucker, 1986).
4. Exchange Systems and Mode of
Entry
Societies that have poor institutional systems are not
able to sustain effective impersonal exchange with
third party enforcement and, consequently, ‘outsiders’
face high uncertainty and transaction costs. A solution
to this problem is to reduce the transaction and
uncertainty costs for ‘outsiders’ by their linking to
agents who operate within ‘insider’ arrangements,
such as tribal or guild-type organisation. Thus, joint
ventures, or other types of collaborative arrangements
between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, provide a means to
reduce the high transaction and uncertainty costs that
afflict ‘outsiders’ wishing to operate in societies that
have poor impersonal exchange with third party
enforcement. The links between institutional systems
and modes of entry are illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Institutional Constraints and Mode of Entry
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The lines in Figure 1 define the possible areas for
different modes of entry. The slopes of the lines are
determined by the trade-off between higher levels of
informal constraints and lower levels of formal
institutional constraints. The slopes of these lines may
be non-linear, indicating complex trade-offs between
formal and informal constraints. An increase in the
transaction and uncertainty costs associated with the
possible combinations of formal and informal
institutional constraints would shift the lines closer to
the origin. The lines indicate boundaries to entry mode
type, based on the transaction and uncertainty costs
for all possible combinations of formal and informal
institutional constraints. The gaps between the lines
indicate the areas where different types of entry mode
are appropriate, given the transaction and uncertainty
costs associated with different institutional systems.
The areas A1, A2 and A3 represent the space that
MNCs face when selecting entry modes. A move from
A1 to A2 ref lects institutional reform that only
inf luences formal constraints. Under these
circumstances, IJVs become more attractive and
wholly owned subsidiaries become a possible entry
method. However, reform of formal constraints that
lack legitimacy may worsen informal constraints by
generating resentment among members of the society
who do not agree with the reforms. This can lead to
the growth of tribal or guild-type economic activity
conducted largely outside the formal institutional
system. Such a development would impose costs on
‘outsiders’ such as MNCs, thus leading to a downward
movement in the available space for entry by MNCs
to, for example, A3. This would reduce the potential
to attract IJVs and discourage the evolution of wholly
owned subsidiaries.
The reforms of government policies and agencies that
are common in many DTCs may fail in many cases
because they are often based on the use of blue prints
for institutional systems that come from developed
countries. Moreover, these programmes focus on
changes to the formal constraints on institutional
systems, whereas informal constraints are arguably of
more importance in developing effective exchange
with third party enforcement. Many DTCs have
engineered substantial changes to the formal
constraints of institutional systems, but this has not
led to significant improvements in economic
development. The problem is that the informal
constraints have not been sufficiently adjusted and,
in many cases, the reform to formal constraints is not
accepted by the people who have to operate within
the new institutional systems. Therefore, these
countries continue to operate on a tribal, guild or
informal network basis, making it difficult for MNCs
to expand the use of IJVs and begin to develop wholly
owned subsidiaries. In cases where reforms lack
legitimacy among groups within the society, they may
encourage the growth of informal guild-type behaviour
that increases the transaction and uncertainty costs
to ‘outsiders’.
Solutions to these problems require DTCs to
transform the informal constraints in their institutional
systems. The reforms must also develop good adaptive
efficiency so that rapid adjustments can be made in
response to changes forced on the business
environment. Furthermore, the reforms to formal
constraints must be legitimate and acceptable to the
people. Societies that are unable, or unwilling, to induce
such changes in their formal and informal constraints
are likely to face widespread use of sub-optimal IJVs.
5. Reforms to the Institutional System
of Jordan
The case of institutional reform in Jordan illustrates
the limitations that arise when reform is centred on
formal institutional systems. Since 1989, Jordan has
engaged in four stabilisation and structural adjustment
reform packages enforced by the IMF and the World
Bank. These reforms have led to reductions in tariff
and non-tariff barriers, liberalisation of price controls,
and privatisation of a number of state-owned
enterprises. The Jordanian government also sought
to encourage foreign investment by introducing a new
investment law in 1995 (modified in 2000) that
provided financial incentives to foreign investors,
eliminated state restrictions on wholly owned
subsidiaries and simplified bureaucratic measures
connected with foreign investments. The strength of
these reforms qualified Jordan for membership of the
WTO, in January 2000.
The political and security situation in the Middle East
has had a profound impact on FDI into Jordan. One
of the effects of the situation in the Middle East is
that Jordan has experienced a large inf low of
Palestinian immigrants, leading to investments and
strong economic links to other states, especially in
the Gulf. This has created special conditions that
impact on DFI into Jordan. The political and security
situation also inf luences Israeli DFI inf lows into
Jordan. Under normal conditions, DFI from Israel
would be very important for Jordan because
investment flows are normally high between countries
that are geographically close (Dunning, 1998a and
b), but the political and security position makes such
investment very difficult. However, these special
circumstances, including the barriers to DFI by Israel,
are not considered in this paper, which focuses rather
on general obstacles to investment in Jordan. These
obstacles are likely to persist even if the political and
security situation in the Middle East were to
dramatically improve.
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Improvements in the political and security situation
following the 1994 peace treaty between Jordan and
Israel did have an important impact on FDI in Jordan,
due to the provision by the USA of duty free entry
into its market for firms operating in special Qualifying
Industrial Zones (QIZ). Five QIZs have been
established, and production and exporting from these
zones began in late 1997 (JIB, 2000).
Despite large-scale liberalisation and privatisation to
promote foreign investment in Jordan, most of this
investment is based on IJVs rather than on wholly
owned subsidiaries. The only sector where wholly
owned subsidiaries can be widely found in Jordan is
in the QIZs. Before the establishment of QIZs, wholly
owned subsidiaries hardly existed in Jordan, except
in some service-oriented projects. As the General
Director of the Investment Promotion Corporation
(Reem Badran) stated: “Foreign investors prefer to
have full control over their investment projects. But
this is not the case in Jordan. Most FDI in Jordan
takes the form of joint ventures, share holding and
management contracts (mainly in hotels), and
strategic alliances.” (Interview, July 1997, Amman).
6. Sources of High Transaction Costs
in Jordan
Jordan has several sources of inefficiencies that
increase transaction costs (Sha’sha, 1991). The
persistence of a tribal mentality in Jordan, which
restricts business activities for people outside well-
placed tribal groups, is one of the most important
sources of high transaction costs for ‘outsiders’ (Layne
1987). The personalised approach to business in
Jordan is further amplified by the problem of Wasta,
which literally means to employ a middleman, or an
intermediary, who secures access to the right decision
makers. The use of Wasta is normally essential for
firms requiring import, export and production licenses,
and for those who need to demonstrate that they
have complied with rules and regulations. In some
cases, Wasta can significantly reduce tax liability and
can ease the requirement to comply with regulations
(El-Said, 1996; El-Said, 2001).
Another source of high transaction costs in Jordan is
Bukrah (tomorrow) and Inshalla (God willing)
attitudes that can lead to long delays in processing
normal business activities. Moreover, public officials
in Jordan normally require firms to play elaborate rituals
of introduction before getting down to business. This
leads to frustration and high transaction costs for
foreign investors. An American investor highlights the
demands on his time arising from this attitude: “This
makes the way of doing business in Jordan different
from the British, Japanese or American way. I can get
the job done in 30 minutes in the US or the UK, but it
takes me three to four days in Jordan.” (Interview,
Amman, 1997).
Corruption represents another impediment to the
efficiency of transactions in Jordan. Direct requests
for money by state officials are not common.
However, requests for gifts, connected to traditional
cultural attitudes, are an important part of the game
of human interaction in Jordan. As a Japanese
investor in Jordan put it: “Everybody is asking for a
contribution. We do not give cash, but we arrange for
some officials to go to Japan on holiday and we cover
all of the costs. Even the highest ranked Jordanian
officials ask for such gifts.” (Interview, Amman, 1997).
Ambiguity in the meaning of laws, and confusion over
the activities and competencies of regulatory
authorities, also increase transaction and uncertainty
costs. Most foreign investors have stated that there
are many state departments involved in activities
connected with business operations, but the role of
each of them is not clear. Investors often have to visit
a large number of government agencies before
eventually finding the right place, or the right sequence
of requests, for obtaining action from state agencies.
Considerable effort and resources are wasted in the
process. Moreover, although laws and regulatory
frameworks regarding investment in Jordan are clear
on paper, their implementation is very complicated.
A report by the World Bank (1997b, p40) confirmed
that “a significant gap exists between the system as
prescribed by laws and regulations and the system in
practice. The foreign business community has voiced
its concerns about these administrative problems and
about the lack of consistency between policies and
implementation at all levels”.
7. The Study
The study is based on semi-structured interviews of
28 foreign companies carried out in 2000. The
interviewees (all of them expatriates) were senior
managers of firms. All of the interviews were
conducted by one of the authors, a Jordanian citizen
who, through his experience of completing his PhD
thesis, had developed skills and knowledge on how
to elicit information on the problems of doing business
in developing countries.
Sixteen of the 28 firms interviewed were located in
four QIZs: Al-Karak, Al-Tajammouat, Al-Hussein and
Ad-Dulayl. At the time of the interviews, they
represented 100 per cent of the firms operating in Al-
Karak, 75 per cent of the firms in Tajammouat, 38 per
cent of the firms in Al-Hussein and 80 per cent of
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those operating in Ad-Dulayl. Therefore, the sample
is a good representation of firms operating in the QIZs.
The main aim of firms operating inside the QIZs is
not to serve the Jordanian or regional markets, but
rather to serve the US market by taking advantage of
free access to this market. The involvement of QIZ-
based firms in the Jordanian market is limited to 27
per cent local content (www.jordaninvestment.com).
The sample of firms outside the QIZs is representative
of foreign investment in Jordan. The twelve firms
represented approximately 50 per cent of the stock
of foreign investments in Jordan in 2000. The sample
is also representative of foreign firms in terms of size
(measured by employment), country of home parent
and sector (www.jordaninvestment.com). By
including firms based in the QIZs, the sample is biased
towards newly established firms and towards the
manufacturing sector. However, the importance of
the QIZs for FDI in Jordan justifies their inclusion.
Table 1 provides an overview of the characteristics of
the sample.
The firms ranked the main infrastructure, formal and
informal institutional obstacles to doing business in
Jordan (see table 2). The selection of potential
obstacles in the infrastructure and formal institutional
categories was informed by the approach used by the
World Bank to investigating these issues (World Bank,
1997a, Kaufmann, 1999). The choice of factors for
informal institutional obstacles was also influenced
by the approach of the World Bank, but the selection
of terms used was, in the case of three factors (tribal
mentality, Wasta and Inshalla), specific to Jordanian
Table 1: Characteristics of Interviewed Firms
C o un try  and  s tart
date in  Jo rd an
S ecto r
Typ e o f
Inv es tmen t ( )
E mp lo ymen t Mark ets  su pp lied  (% )
1 2 3 4
1. Japan  1997 Manufacturing JV (52%)  2500 70 20 10 na
2. Japan  1992 Manufacturing JV (40%)    109 5 95 na na
3. Japan  1997 Manufacturing JV (40%)     39 100 na na na
4. Japan  2000 Trading WO       5 90 10 na na
5. Japan  1997 Trading WO       9 70 30 na na
6. Japan  1975 Trading WO      4 25 65 na na
7. UK      1995 Manufacturing JV (25%)     52 10 90 na na
8. France 2000 Telecoms JV (65%) 4800 100 na na na
9. France 2000 Bank JV (62%)   220 70 30 na na
10. France  1984 Services WO    25 60 40 na na
11.Sweden1997 Services WO    30 60 40 na na
12. NL *    2000 Manufacturing JV (50%)  750 na na 15 85
13. USA    2000 Services WO   na 95 5 na na
14. USA*    2000 Manufacturing JV (50%)  120 na na na 100
15. USA*    2000 Manufacturing WO  890 na na na 100
16. USA* # 2000 Manufacturing JV (80%)  120 na na na 100
17. HK *     2000 Manufacturing WO  350 na na na 100
18. HK *     2000 Manufacturing WO  660 na na na 100
19. HK *     2000 Manufacturing WO 1000 na na na 100
20. Taiwan *2000 Manufacturing WO   600 na na na 100
21. China *  1999 Manufacturing JV (26%) 1800 na na na 100
22. China *  1999 Manufacturing WO 2000 na na na 100
23. Pak *     2000 Manufacturing JV (50%)   600 na na na 100
24. Pak *     1999 Manufacturing WO 1200 na na na 100
25. Pak *     2001 Manufacturing WO   170 na na na 100
26. Pak *     2001 Manufacturing WO     52 na na na 100
27. Pak *     2000 Manufacturing WO      35 na na na 100
28. Pak *     2000 Manufacturing WO    450 na na na 100
* Located in QIZ
1 Jordan   2 Middle East and North Africa    3  European Union   4  USA
# USA/Lebanese firm
( ) Share of JV held by Jordanian partner
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conditions. This was done in order to capture the role
of important informal institutional obstacles to
effective business operations in the Jordanian
context.
8. Results
The results reveal that wholly owned subsidiaries are
in the minority of the firms that are not located in the
QIZs (see table 1). Wholly owned subsidiaries not in
QIZs are restricted to firms that are small, in terms of
employment, and that are in the trading or service
sectors. All of the manufacturing firms and large
employers strongly involved in the Jordanian or
Middle East and North African markets were IJVs.
Moreover, firms not in QIZs that were established
after the main reforms in Jordan, that is in the post
1995 period, tend to be IJVs.
Informal, formal and infrastructure problems are all
revealed as obstacles to effective operations by foreign
investors (see table 2). In terms of significant problems
(in the top three obstacles), those associated with
formal and informal institutional systems were
generally regarded as more significant than difficulties
with infrastructure. Problems of finding skilled workers,
along with poor logistical systems, were the most
important reported infrastructure obstacles. Seven
formal and informal institutional factors were
considered more important than infrastructure
obstacles (other than lack of skilled workers and poor
logistical systems) – the attitude of bureaucrats,
investment incentives, governmental administration
systems, tribal mentality, pace of reforms, Wasta and
clarity of rules. Nine formal and informal institutional
obstacles were regarded as more serious problems
than half of the infrastructure problems. Corruption
was not high on the list of significant problems,
compared to other formal and informal institutional
factors. In fact, four infrastructure problems were listed
as more significant problems than corruption.
The top ranked problem was lack of skilled workers,
but the next four top ranked problems were
institutional factors (two formal and two informal) -
governmental administration systems, investment
incentives, attitude of bureaucrats and tribal mentality.
Corruption was only indicated as a top ranked problem
by 4% of firms, the same as two of the infrastructure
problems – water supply, and roads and transport.
Three of the infrastructure obstacles were not recorded
as a top ranked problem by any firms – marketing
systems, electricity supply and telecom services.
Informal institutional factors were revealed as the top
ranked obstacle for the total sample (see Figure 2).
However, the difference was not large - 36% for
informal obstacles, and 32% for both formal and
In fras tru c tu re
O b stac les
S ign ific an t
p ro b lems #
To p  rank ed
ob s tac le *
Skilled workers 68  (1=) 50  (1)
Logistical
systems 61  (5) 14  (6=)
Small economy 30  (12=) 14  (6=)
Water s up p ly 32  (10=)   4 (10=)
Roads and
transport 20  (16)   4 (10=)
Marketing
systems 18  (17)  -
Electricity supply 14  (18)  -
Telecoms
systems 11  (.19)  -
F o rmal
O b stac les
S ign ific an t
p ro b lems #
To p  rank ed
ob s tac le *
Govt Admin
systems 64  (3=) 32 (2)
Investment
incentives 64  (3=) 28 (3=)
Pace of reforms 50  (7)   8 (8=)
Clarity of rules 39  (9)   4 (10=)
Taxation system 32  (10=) 14 (6=)
Legal system 30  (12=)   8 (8=)
In fo rmal
O b stac les
S ign ific an t
p ro b lems #
To p  rank ed
ob s tac le *
Attitudes of
bureaucrats 68 (1=) 28 (3=)
Tribal mentality 53 (6) 18 (5)
Wasta 46 (8) 14 (6=)
Inshalla 28 (14) 10 (7)
Corruption 22 (15)   4 (10=)
# % of firms that rank obstacle as a significant problem (in the
top three obstacles)
 * % of firms that place obstacle as the most important problem
(  ) ranking of obstacle
Table 2: Infrastructure, formal and informal
institutional obstacles to effective business
operations (%)
infrastructure obstacles. Firms in QIZs had the lowest
level of top ranked problems for informal institutional
obstacles - 25% compared to 37.5% for formal and
infrastructure obstacles. Those firms not in QIZs
ranked informal institutional obstacles as the top
problem, with 50% as compared to 25% for formal
and infrastructure obstacles. Wholly owned
subsidiaries reported a higher top ranking for formal
institutional and infrastructure obstacles than for
informal institutional obstacles. IJVs ranked informal
institutional obstacles as the top problem, with
infrastructure problems second and formal
institutional problems third. Wholly owned
subsidiaries reported higher levels of top ranking for
formal institutional obstacles than IJVs. Informal
institutional and infrastructure obstacles received more
top ranking by IJVs than by wholly owned subsidiaries.
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The highest top ranking was recorded for informal
institutional obstacles for IJVs (45%) and for firms
not located in QIZs (50%). The next top ranked
obstacles were formal and infrastructure obstacles for
firms in QIZs (37.5%). Infrastructure obstacles were
the top ranked problem for 36% of IJVs.
The discussions with the interviewees, facilitated by
the semi-structured nature of the interviews, revealed
that in IJVs the foreign partner regarded the main
contribution of the Jordanian partner as the ability to
relate to government agencies and the domestic
business community. Most of the wholly owned
subsidiaries used Jordanian law firms or other types
of intermediaries to handle their relationships with
government agencies and the business community.
All of the firms not in QIZs, that were IJVs, reported
that they would prefer to operate with wholly owned
subsidiaries, but that the institutional system in Jordan
made joint ventures a better option.
The main problems with infrastructure were costly
and inefficient logistical systems and difficulties with
labour skills. The major issue with labour skills was
finding workers with the appropriate technical
knowledge. However, firms also reported difficulties
in securing labour that could work effectively with
other workers who were considered lower down the
social (tribal) ladder. In the case of formal institutional
factors, the major problems related to dealing with
government agencies and the pace of reform were
that it took a long time to get things done and it was
difficult to process issues involving new procedures.
The problems associated with investment incentives
were that they were considered too low by those firms
not in QIZs. In the area of informal institutional
obstacles, the attitude of bureaucrats, Wasta and the
tribal mentality were reported to lead to long delays
in making decisions and difficulties in locating the
correct decision makers. Those firms in IJVs found it
difficult to deal with their Jordanian partners because
of the time consuming and elaborate procedures
associated with obtaining approval from government
agencies, or with making everyday business decisions.
The wholly owned subsidiaries that used Jordanian
law firms, or other types of intermediaries, accepted
the need for such help as a necessary, but unwelcome,
cost of doing business in Jordan.
9. Discussion
The findings of the study provide support for the view
that both formal and informal institutional constraints
lead to significant obstacles for foreign investors.
Although infrastructure obstacles do present
problems, these were mainly due to a lack of skilled
labour and poor logistical systems. In the case of skilled
labour, at least part of the problem could be attributed
to an informal institutional constraint, namely, the
unwillingness of workers to collaborate effectively with
people from different tribal backgrounds.
Institutional constraints appear to have a marked
effect on the mode of entry. Using Jordanian partners
to deal with formal and informal institutional
constraints was reported as the main reason for the
Figure 2: Percentage of Firms with First Ranking Formal, Informal and Infrastructure Obstacles
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use of IJVs in those firms not located in QIZs. Some
of the top-rated formal institutional constraints, for
example, governmental administration systems, the
pace of reforms and the clarity of rules, may be at
least partly due to the way that these systems are
operated.  Specifically, the attitudes and norms of
behaviour that prevail in the operation of formal
institutional systems are perhaps the main reason for
firms reporting problems with these formal
institutional factors. Support of this view is found in
reports from the interviewees that the main problem
with these formal institutional factors was the time
and effort needed to deal with government agencies
and to conduct standard business transactions. This
implies that the real cause of these problems is informal
institutional factors, such as Wasta, and the attitudes
of bureaucrats. Although the interviewer sought to
separate these factors, it is possible that the
interviewees did not appreciate the subtleties of these
distinctions. This problem highlights the difficulties
of researching the effects of intangible factors, such
as attitudes and norms of behaviour, when
investigating institutional failings. This implication of
the results of the study provides support for the
conclusions of some quantitative studies indicating
that a clearer understanding of the interaction between
formal and informal institutional constraints is
important to identify the nature of the obstacles that
affect foreign investors in DTCs (Abed and Davoodi,
2000; Wei, 2000).
This study also supports the view that corruption is
not the most serious institutional failing (Wei, 2000).
In Jordan, corruption was not among the most
significant problems. The relatively low significance
attributed to obstacles from the legal and taxation
systems also indicates that much of the literature may
be focused on issues that are less important than
matters such as attitudes to formal institutional
systems and the persistence of tribal or guild-like
behaviour in business transactions. Alternatively,
Jordan may be different from other DTCs where
problems with legal and taxation systems are deemed
to be very significant problems (UNCTAD, 1995;
Goberman and Shaprio, 1999). It is also possible that
the focus on corruption, legal and taxation systems
stems from the availability of quantitative data on these
factors that permits the use of statistical techniques
of analysis.
The challenge is to investigate the nature of intangible
factors, such as attitudes to formal institutional
systems, and then to seek methods of measuring these
variables to permit the application of robust
quantitative techniques. These issues should be
investigated in societies with similar institutional
systems as Jordan, for example, Middle Eastern and
North African countries such as Egypt, Morocco and
Tunisia, to see if similar results can be found. If
allowance were made for the specific conditions in
Jordan, for example, Wasta and tribal mentality, it
would be possible to test for the impact of informal
institutional constraints in many DTCs by replacing
concepts such as Wasta and tribal mentality with
informal institutional factors relevant to the countries
being studied. Such research would help to identify
the important institutional obstacles to the
development in DTCs.
The high ranking attributed by IJVs in Jordan to
informal institutional obstacles is a rather strange
finding, given that it has been argued that the use of
joint ventures in DTCs is primarily in order to deal
with these informal institutional obstacles. However,
the discussions with the interviewees indicated that
the problem was due to the foreign partners struggling
to understand and adjust to the elaborate and time
consuming game that has to be played by their
Jordanian partners in order to do business in Jordan.
Wholly owned subsidiaries, which reported fewer
problems with informal institutional obstacles, have
less exposure to these problems because they
subcontract the relationships with government
agencies and the domestic business community to
law firms and other intermediaries. This implies that a
solution to this problem is either to subcontract to
intermediaries or to establish IJVs where the
organisational pattern of the parent company is
dominant. In the latter case, the domestic partner
adjusts to the organisational approach of the parent
and deals with institutional constraints in ways that
are understandable and acceptable to the parent (Fey
and Beamish, 2001).
The case of the QIZ in Jordan demonstrates that
foreign investors can be induced to set up wholly
owned subsidiaries in DTCs that have significant
institutional failings. However, the firms in the QIZs
are only loosely connected to the Jordanian economy
and the spillover benefits from these investments are
likely to be small. Furthermore, removal of free access
to the US market is likely to lead to divestment by
most, if not all, of the firms based in the QIZs.
10. Conclusion
This paper has argued that institutional failings,
particularly informal institutional obstacles, have
significant effects on the mode of entry and on the
contribution that FDI can make to economic
development. The results from the interviews support
this argument. Although infrastructure problems were
identified as having an adverse impact on MNCs in
Jordan, they were focused on two particular problems
– lack of skilled labour and poor logistical systems.
Formal and informal institutional constraints appear
to be more problematic. Moreover, corruption and
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deficiencies in legal and taxation systems, normally
identified in the literature as the major institutional
failings, were not as serious as informal constraints,
such as Wasta and tribal mentality. The apparent
connection between, for example, the attitude of
bureaucrats (an informal institutional constraint) and
the clarity of rules (a formal institutional constraint),
provides support for the view that a clearer
understanding of institutional failings requires closer
study and investigation of the links between formal
and informal institutional factors.
Further research is needed to develop the work carried
out in this study. A closer investigation of the nature
of IJVs is necessary in order to investigate the role of
domestic partners and to assess the importance of
different types of IJVs. For example, the impact of
majority and minority share holdings, and the
importance of whether the IJV is the result of
privatisation, acquisition or greenfield investment.
Comparative studies would also be valuable in order
to determine whether common patterns are evident
across different DTCs. Other Middle Eastern and
North African countries may have similar informal
institutional obstacles to those in Jordan. However, it
is likely that many DTCs have similar problems with
formal and informal institutional constraints, but it is
possible that the nature of the intangible institutional
constraints are not the same as those that prevail in
Jordan, and perhaps in other Middle Eastern and
North African countries.  Studies identifying the
relevant informal institutional factors, such as Wasta,
tribal attitudes and the other such intangible factors,
in other DTCs would help to identify important
institutional obstacles to reaping better benefits from
DFI inf lows. This would most likely be an
improvement on studies that maintain orthodox views
on these matters and only look for problems with
corruption, administrative malfunction and arbitrary
taxation and regulatory frameworks.
Clearer identification and measurement of the formal
and informal institutional constraints is also necessary
to permit the application of robust quantitative
techniques assessing the relative importance of the
various factors and their links to FDI inflows.  This
will require detailed work in order to clarify the nature
of the obstacles, and to find workable methods to
measure the intangible factors. Furthermore, given that
the types of informal (and intangible) institutional
constraints vary across DTCs, it will be important to
find ways of making the results comparable, so that it
will be possible to identify the relative importance of
the different types of informal institutional constraints.
It is possible for quantitative data on issues such as
corruption, administrative malfunction, taxation data
and other orthodox measures of institutional failure
to provide good proxies for the type of intangible
informal factors discussed in this paper. If this can be
established by careful consideration of the nature of
these intangible factors in DTCs, the problem of
conducting comparable studies across different DTCs
would be greatly reduced.
Such research would help to develop policies enabling
DTCs overcome institutional failings that hamper
beneficial DFI inflows. However, the importance of
informal institutional factors indicates that the
necessary reforms will be difficult to implement in
DTCs with no history of developing institutional
systems conducive to low transaction costs and with
high levels of adaptive efficiency. It may take a long
time for some DTCs to escape the dead hand of history
that has bequeathed to them informal institutional
systems that are very resistant to change.
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